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STUDENT NoTiEs

Kentucky squarely involving the question, the grantor's deed was
avoided in an action at law.n While that is a very old case and stands
by itself, the Court of Appeals has indicated in a late case that it
would possibly follow the majority view on the question.3
EUOFGNE R. WEBB.
REMITTITUR

IN KENTUCKY

Ordinarily the term remittitur is applied to a voluntary remission
of part of the damages found by the jury. But in the Kentucky
decisions, as well as those of some other states,' the setting aside of
part of a separable verdict by the court when it has committed error
by admission of certain evidence or by giving particular instructions
resulting in an excessive verdict, has been called a remittitur.
I.
May the trial court give the recovering party the option of accepting a reduction of the verdict or submission to a new trial? In Brown
2
v. Morris, a malicious prosecution case, the plaintiff received a verdict.
The defendant, alleging excessive damages, moved for a new trial.
The court said a new trial would be granted unless the plaintiff would
take one-fourth the verdict. Plaintiff objected but took judgment for
the latter amount. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed
the holding of the trial court saying that in this instance the lower
court had virtually assessed the damages, thereby depriving each
party of his right to an assessment by a jury. The court in Chattaroi
3
Railroad Company v. Leftwitch, an action for wrongful death caused
by the alleged wilful negligence of defendant's employees, cited Brown
v. Morris and granted a new trial-the lower court had remitted, notwithstanding plaintiff's objection, $5,000 of a $9,000 verdict. Louisville
4
& Nashville RailroadCompany v. Earl's AdministratriX, another wrongful death case, is in accord. These cases indicate that where the
recovering party objects to a remittitur when the verdict is for
unliquidated damages and is inseparable, the trial court may not enter
judgment for an amount less than that found by the jury.
The court in Johnson's Administrator v. JohnsoW. sustained a
release of part of the verdict. Even though the plaintiff objected, the
remittitur was held valid because the court assumed (the evidence
"Wall v. Hill's Heirs, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon.) 290, 36 Am. Dec. 578
(1841).
'*Transylvania University v. McDonald's Ex'r., 277 Ky. 608, 126
S. W. (2d) 1117, 1119 (1939).
'McCormick on Damages (1935) Section 19.
266 Ky. (3 Bush) 81 (1867).
37 Ky. Law Rep. 165, 13 Ky. Op. 480 (1885).
' 94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607 (1893).
5104 Ky. 714, 47 S. W. 883 (1898).
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was not before it) that the lower court must have been able to pick
out the particular items constituting the excess.
'If the court's instructions . . . failed to require the jury to
omit from their findings the value of such property as, by reason
of its nature, vested absolutely in the wife, and it was ascertainable
from the proof what amount had in fact been allowed by the jury on
account of such property, then the court could properly have
of the judgment to the extent of the value of
required a reduction
6
such property."
From this decision it appears that the court may on its own
motion grant a new trial, unless the plaintiff submits to a stated
remittitur, in those cases where the court can ascertain the amount
allowed by the jury for specific items, when those items were by error
of the court given or left to the jury. Hence it is not necessary in
every case that the party recovering the verdict assent to the
remittitur.
I.
May the party liable object to a remittitur? Where a verdict is
flagrantly against the evidence, indicating that the jury was prejudiced
or indifferent, the party liable may object to a remittitur as curing
7
the verdict
It is uncertain whether the Court of Appeals would sustain a
voluntary remittitur in a case of excessive unliquidated damages where
there is no indication of misconduct or prejudice on the part of the
jury nor a separable verdict containing items erroneously included.
In a majority of the states which have passed upon this latter situation, a remittitur is allowed to cure the excess
Whether the remittitur shall be granted depends upon the determination of how far the defendant's right to an assessment of damages
by a jury shall be carried. Many factors enter into a solution of the
question, some of which are: the number of cases pending in the trial
court, the amount involved in the controversy, the cost-both to the
public and the parties-of further or prolonged litigation, and the
substantial necessity for a new trial to properly determine the rights
of the respective parties. Statutes providing for summary jurisdiction
in specified types of cases show that a jury trial may, when impractical, be dispensed with in order to economize and to expedite litigation. It should be noted that the courts have the power to determine
0104 Ky. 714, 719, 47 S. W. 883, 884 (1898).
7 Merrick v. Holt, 8 Ky. law Rep. 162.
"The entire verdict is
impeached as a product of a spirit that infuses into every part of it
the taint of positive wrong or reckless indifference. It may be that
proof of its prevalence can be found most readily in the excessive
amount of damages; but when by that or other manifestation its
existence is sufficiently shown, it is not seemly to compel the injured
party to submit to a verdict so brought forth." Ia. at 165.
1 See Note (1928) 53 A. L. R. 779, at '83; McCormick on Damages
(1935) Sec. 19; 46 Corpus Juris 429.
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whether a verdict is excessive; then as a practical solution why not
permit the court to say what amount will not be excessive? Some
courts take the position that a judgment entered after the remittitur
Is still a jury finding because it is evident that they considered the
plaintiff damaged to the extent of the lesser amount when they rendered a verdict for a greater sum. 0 Some courts admit that the rule
permitting a remittitur is illogical but justify it by saying that it is
necessary to put an end to litigation and that everyone has a constitutional right to receive promptly that which is justly due him. n
Do the Kentucky cases furnish any basis from which we may predict the probable solution of the following question? Is a remittitur
permissible in a case of unliquidated damages when neither the jury nor
trial court is at fault, except that the jury's estimate of the damages
is excessive in the opinion of the court? Although this issue was
raised in Otte v. Otte,1 the court placed its decision upon the assumption (the evidence was not before the court) that the trial court had
granted the remittitur in accord with the rules that prevail in this
jurisdiction. The court stated the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction,
namely that
".. . when the jury has acted upon the facts, and found a verdict,
sustained by the evidence and the instructions, there may be
remission that will cure the error of the court in giving instructions which produced the excess in damages, whenever it can be
attributed to the error of the court; and it is upon the party
claiming under the verdict to make this showing."' 3
But this rule does not necessarily exclude other possible situations in
which a remittitur might be granted. Furthermore the court makes no
positive statement that a remittitur in case of unliquidated damages
is against the decisions of this state; but it says that
"It was not ruled (in Brown v. Morris, 3 Bush 81, a malicious
prosecution case; or in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
v. Earl's Administratrix, a wrongful death case) that the court
was without power with the consent or on the motion of the
recovering plaintiff to remit a portion of the sum of the recovery
fixed by the verdict of the jury."' 4
Though the court cites Masterson v. Haganm5 for dicta that "had the
court submitted to the jury only the question of damages for physical
and mental suffering, then the plaintiff, in order to avoid a new trial,
could not have remitted a part of the judgment""' a reading of the
case fails to disclose any such language.
'See Nicholds v. Crystal Plate Glass Co., 126 Mo. 55, 28 S. W. 991,
994 (1894).
"'See International & G. N. R. Co. v. Wilkes, 68 Tex. 617, 5 S. W.
491 (1887).
See Belt R. Co. v. Charters, 123 Ill. App. 322 (1905).
"259 Ky. 741, 83 S. W. (2d) 42 (1935).
"259 Ky. 741, 743, 83 S. W. (2d) 42, 44 (1935).
259 Ky. 741, 743, 83 S. W. (2d) 42, 44 (1935).
256
Ky. (17 B. Mon. 325) 259 (1856).
26259 Ky. 741, 744, 83 S. W. (2d) 42, 44 (1935).
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Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Earl's Administra7
trix,1
Chattaroi Railroad Company v. Leftwitch1" and Brown v. Morris"
have been referred to as holding that, where there is no positive
criterion for determining the excess damage, a remittitur is denied,
but on analysis the cases will not support such a broad rule. In Brown
v. Morris, an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff objected
to remission of $3,000 from a $4,000 verdict; and the Court of Appeals
reversed the holding of the lower court. Though the case contains
words from which we might conclude that a remittitur is denied in
a suit for unliquidated damages where there is no positive criterion
for determining the excess damage,= they must be viewed in the light of
the entire case. The fact that the court in 1867 knew "no precedent for
overruling a motion for a new trial on terms required of the party oppos''
ing it"
is to be accounted for by the fact that remittitur has largely
developed since that date. Chattaroi Railroad Company v. Letwitch,
and Louisvile & Nashville Railroad Company v. Earl's Administratrix
are cases, like Brown v. Morris, in which the recovering party objected
to the remittitur. The Earl case contains dicta that a remittitur will
not be allowed in a wrongful death case:
"Both parties complain, and it is evident that if the company
were entitled to a new trial, it should have been granted without
the imposition of any terms; if not, the appellee should have had
her judgment in pursuance of the jury finding."' 2
Cases in which the defendant seeks a new trial alleging that the
verdict is excessive, but where remittitur is not involved, may have
some bearing on our problem. In Louisville Gas Company v. Pages
the court said:
"The mere fact that the court would not have fixed the compensation as high as a jury has done is no reason for setting the
verdict aside and granting a new trial. To justify the court in
doing so, the verdict must be so excessive as to induce the belief
that it was caused by the passion or prejudice of the jury."
In Snyder v. Louisville Railway Company,= a personal injury case, the
court stated that the trial court does not have the discretionary right
to grant a new trial because the verdict appears to be excessive, unless
it is so glaringly disproportionate to the damages as to appear at first
blush to have resulted from passion or prejudice. The court concludes
in Rose v. Edmonds,' another personal injury case, that the amount of
?94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607 (1893).
I'7 Ky. Law Rep.. 165, 13 Ky. Op. 480 (1885).
1"66 Ky. (3 Bush) 81 (1867-).
46 Corpus Juris 429, New Trials, Section 499.
2 "In this instance the court itself virtually assessed the damages,
and thereby deprived each party of his right to an assessment by a
jury." 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 81, 83 (1867).
66 Ky. (3 Bush) 81, 83 (1867).
2L. & N. R. Co. v. Earl's Admx., 94 Ky. 368, 371, 22 S. W. 607, 608
(1893).
1127 Ky. Law Rep. 885, -, 86 S. W. 1112, 1113 (1905).
"150 Ky. 816, 150 S. W. 986 (1912).
-271 Ky. 36, 111 S. W. (2d) 427 (1937).
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damages in such cases is peculiarly within the province of the jury,
and that the court would not set aside the verdict as excessive unless
It was plainly the result of passion or prejudice. In view of the foregoing holdings it would seem that remittitur is improper in personal
injury cases, since a trial court abuses its discretion by setting aside
a verdict as excessive unless it is so flagrantly excessive as to appear
the result of passion or prejudice, and if the latter is present a remission will not cure the defect. However, remittitur was not in issue
in these cases.
Although the decisions of this State have settled only a few problems concerning remittitur, the following conclusions are ventured.
(a) The trial court may on its own motion without the assent of
the recovering party remit that portion of the verdict representing
separable items, the amounts of which are known or are ascertainable,
where those Items were erroneously submitted to the jury.
(b) The defendant must be granted a new trial where the verdict
is flagrantly against the evidence, or where there is proof of ample
prejudice, passion, or indifference on the part of the jury.
(c) It is uncertain whether the party liable may except to a
voluntary remittitur in a case of unliquidated damages where the court
finds no fault with the verdict except that the jury's estimate of the
damages exceeds the amount it thinks might properly have been found.
CLARENCE CORIELUS.
CONVEYANCES OF LAND IDENTIFIED BY MONUMENTS OF
APPRECIABLE WIDTH
When property is conveyed and identified by monuments of appreciable width, the question arises as to the particular part of the monument
that is to control. The problem is raised most frequently when the
boundary is a highway, private way, or water course, and it is the purpose of this note to discuss briefly the construction to be put upon such a
conveyance in Kentucky.
In the case of Blalock, v. Atwood,' the court said that a conveyance
of land bounded on a public way carried with it the fee to the center of
such way, unless a contrary intention appeared upon the face of the
instrument or from the circumstances. The court gave the reason for
such a holding as being that the purchaser of the lot, doubtless, would
not have purchased it but for the usual benefits of the street; therefore,
'154 Ky. 39, 157 S. W. 694 (1913). Accord: City of Fordyce v.
Hampton, 179 Ark. 705, 17 S. W. (2d) 869 (1929); Bowers v. Atchison
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 119 Kan. 202, 237 Pac. 913 (1925); Schnieder v. Jacob,
86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350 (1887); Henry v. Board of Trustees of Dioceses
of Kentucky, 207 Ky. 846, 270 S. W. 476 (1925); Campeggi v. Wakefield,
157 Md. 229, 145 AtI. 546 (1929); Land v. Brooks, 241 Mich. 452, 217
N. W. 34 (1928); Hunter v. Van Kueren, 224 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1927);
Vanderbilt University v. Williams, 152 Tenn. 664, 280 S. W. 689 (1926) ;
MacCorkle v. City of Charleston, 105 W. Va. 395, 142 S. E. 841 (1935);
Spence v. Frantz, 195 Wis. 69, 217 N. W. 700 (1928).

